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ReNorming Immigration Court
Stacy Caplow*

"For the [noncitizens] who appear before them our immigrationjudges are the face of American justice.... Not all . . .will be entitled to the relief they seek. But I insist that each case be reviewed
proficiently and that each.., be treated with courtesy and respect."
- Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales**

I. Introduction
The Immigration Courts are in distress. Federal appellate judges have
been scathing in their criticisms' and the
national media has latched onto these
stories.2 Critiques of immigration adjudication are not new, but the increased in-

tensity of such criticisms has focused a
spotlight onto these administrative tribunals, traditionally a haven for immigration enforcement officials who have
landed secure civil service jobs. This
spate of bad publicity captured Attorney
General Alberto Gonzales' attention; he

* Stacy Caplow, Professor of Law and Director of Clinical Education, Brooklyn Law School. Much
gratitude for the unwavering support to my colleague and friend, Maryellen Fullerton; to Jessica Segall, Pooja
Argawal and Laura Bellrose for research assistance; and to the Brooklyn Law School Summer Research
Stipend Program.
** Memorandum from Attorney General Alberto Gonzales to Member of the Board of Immigration Appeals (Jan. 9, 2006) available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.info/pdf/06202-asy-ag-memo-bia.pdf (last visited
Mar. 27, 2008).
1. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, and Judge Richard A. Posner, in particular, has led
the charge against flawed decision making. Judge Posner decried the "systematic failure by the judicial officers of the immigration service to provide reasoned analysis for the denial of applications for asylum," Guchshenkov v. Ashcroft, 366 F.3d 554, 560 (7th Cir. 2004), and pointed out that the Seventh Circuit had remanded
40% of the petitions for review of immigration cases on its docket. Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828, 829
(7th Cir. 2005), John R. Floss, Seeking Asylum in a Hostile System: The Seventh CircuitReverses to Confront a
Broken Process, 1 SEVENTH CIRCUIT REV. 216 (2006), at http://www.kentlaw.edul7cr/vl-l/floss.pdf.
2. See, e.g., Appeals Panel Rips 'Abusive' Phil. Immigration Judge, PHIL. INQ. Apr. 30, 2006; Nina Bernstein, Judge Who Chastised Weeping Asylum Seeker Is Taken Off Case, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2007, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/20/nyregion/20immigrant.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2008) [hereinafter Berstein 11; Nina Bernstein, U.S. Relieves Judge of Duties in Courtroom, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2007, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/13/nyregion/13judge.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2008) [hereinafter Bernstein
2] ; Adam Liptak, Courts Criticize Judges' Handlingof Asylum Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 2005, availableat
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/26/national/26immigration.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2008).
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announced that it is finally time to reform the Immigration Courts.
This essay argues that successful reforms are the product of a shift in norms
throughout the court. Courtesy, respect,
professionalism, and transparency are
key to reforming the Immigration Court,
and many, if not all of the current immigration judges want to be part of a system that embodies such values. These
values, and the specific reforms initiated
by Attorney General Gonzales and his
successors, will only take root and succeed if they are endorsed and accepted by
the people they affect: the Immigration
Judges who must buy into these changes.
Additionally, reforms will only be effective if they appear credible to the public,
especially the lawyers who practice in
and the non-citizens whose lives are affected by Immigration Court rulings. Finally, the respect of exasperated and
often vituperative federal judges must be
restored.
This goal can be achieved by implementing small-scale procedures capable
of grassroots change within the Immigration Court. Without radical legislative
changes or major infusions of financial
resources, immigration judges can institute and internalize changes in daily habits, personal values, and attitudes. The
new norms will lead to increased credibility and respect for immigration courts
and judges. Furthermore, meaningful
and genuine re-norming in the Immigration Court will produce greater under-

standing of and esteem for the
performance of individual judges and the
court as an institution.
Specifically, this commentary recommends the following normative changes:
"
"
*
"
"
•
"
"
*

adopting fixed renewable terms for
judges with transparent selection criteria
creating clear and public performance
standards
drafting clear retention standards
greater oversight of conduct on the
bench
remedial action when judges' performances fall below acceptable standards
standardizing and publicizing evidentiary norms
building time for training and reflection into the court's workload
authoring and publicizing written decisions
supporting a system of appointed
counsel

Creating these new standards and
approaches to immigration adjudication
will not be easy, but the proposals I make
would lead to an Immigration Court that
is very different from the status quo.
These changes can be made without the
destabilization and disorientation that
often accompanies major federal government reorganization. There is an evergrowing academic community interested
in immigration law and procedure, as
well as an active immigration bar, both in
private settings and in public service organizations, that can be mobilized into
working groups to help immigration
judges and government officials re-norm
the Immigration Court.

3. See Gonzales Memorandum, supra note 1; also Pamela A. MacClean, Immigration Judges Come
Under Fire, CriticsSay System Oversight is Weak, NAT'L L. J. Jan. 30, 2006, at 1.
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II.

Immigration Court Today

Much has been written about the how
the Immigration Court evolved to its current status. 4 Many proposals to alter the
structure of immigration adjudication
have been advanced unsuccessfully over
the years.5 Recently there have been numerous failed legislative initiatives to
restructure immigration courts and adjudication.6 My focus in this essay will be
on reforms that can be developed and put
into place now. I will start with a short
sketch of the current Immigration Court
structure, and I will then expand on the
new norms that should be developed and
instilled.
Under the aegis of the Executive Office of Immigration Review (EOIR), Im-

migration Courts throughout the country
are staffed by judges, administrators,
support staff, interpreters, and clerical
personnel. There are 51 courts located in
23 states, including Puerto Rico with approximately 210-215 judges currently sitting. 7 According to EOIR statistics, the
Immigration Courts handled an enormous caseload in 2006 - totaling well
over 300,000.8 Most observers agree that
more judges and increased support are
needed to handle this caseload. 9
Immigration Court basically looks,
feels, and operates like most other courts
but some of its characteristics strike even
experienced litigators as foreign. The
court lacks formal rules of evidence.1°
Non-lawyers can appear on behalf of re-

4. See, e.g., Sidney B. Rawitz, From Wong Yang Sung to Black Robes, 65 INTERPRETER RELEASES 453
(1988); MICHAEL J. CREPPY, H. JERE ARMSTRONG, THOMAS L. PULLEN, BRIAN M. O'LEARY & ROBERT P. OWENS,
THE UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION COURT IN THE 21ST CENTURY 67-88 (1999) [hereinafter CREPPY, ET AL.].
5. See, e.g. Maurice Roberts, Proposed:A Specialized Statutory Immigration Court, 18 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
1, 7 (1980); Dana Marks Keener & Denise Noonan Slavin, An Independent Immigration Court:An Idea Whose
Time Has Come 8 (2002)(on file with author); Dana Leigh Marks, An Urgent Priority: Why Congress Should
Establish an Article I Immigration Court, 13-1 BENDER'S IMMIG BULL. 3, 5 (2008); U.S. COMM'N ON IMMIGRATION REFORM, BECOMING AN AMERICAN: IMMIGRATION AND IMMIGRANT POLICY 174-182 (1997) (recommending
independent executive agency).
6. See, e.g., United States Immigration Court Act of 1996, H.R. 4258, 104th Cong. (1996); United States
Immigration Court Act of 1998, H.R. 4107, 105th Cong. (1998); United States Immigration Court Act of 1999,
H.R. 185, 106th Cong. (1999); Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2006, S. 2611, 109th Cong. § 707
(2006); Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2007, S. 1348, 110th Cong. §§ 701-707 (2007).
7. U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGR. REV., LIST OF ADMIN. CONTROL CTS. (Feb. 8, 2008)
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/sibpages/ICadr.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2008).
8. The vast majority of these cases (317,032) were removal proceedings. U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., ExEc. OFFICE OF IMMIGR. REV., FY 2006 STAT. YEAR BOOK Al (2007) available at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/statspub/
fy06syb.pdf [hereinafter YEAR BOOK].
9. See, e.g., Stuart L. Lustig, Kevin Delucchi, Lakshika Tennakoon, Brent Kaul,, Dana Leigh Marks &
Denise Slavin, Burnout and Stress Among United States Immigration Judges, 13-1 BENDER'S IMMIGR. BULL.
22, 29-30 (2008) (on file with author); Human Rights First, Summary of Recommendations Relating to the
Comprehensive Review of the Immigration Courts and the Board of Immigration Appeals, available at http://
www.humanrightsfirst.org/pdf/recs-doj.pdf (last visited Mar. 27, 2006); John T. Noonan, Jr., Symposium on
Immigration Appeals and JudicialReview: Immigration Law 2006, 55 CATH. U. L. REV. 905, 916 (2006).
10. FED. R. EVID. 1101. The rules of evidence are relaxed in immigration hearings. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.7
(2008) ("The immigration judge may receive in evidence any oral or written statement that is material and
relevant to any issue in the case previously made by the respondent or any other person during any investigation, examination, hearing, or trial."). See also, Matter of Wadad, 19 I. & N. Dec. 182, 188 (BIA 1984). Hear-
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spondents." Generally neither routine
calendar proceedings nor the non-testimonial portions of hearings are interpreted to non-English speakers.12
Lawyers for the government work very
closely with the judges, and they are
sometimes observed engaging in bad habits, such as ex parte conversations.
Most immigration judges (IJs) are
dedicated, diligent and compassionate.
They work long days under arduous conditions. Caseloads are high and what is
at stake is enormous, creating huge pressure given the often antagonistic goals of
efficiency and thoroughness. Despite unquestionable improvements over the past
two decades under the EOIR stewardship
to create a judiciary that is competent
and impartial, the Immigration Court remains a flawed institution subject to criticism from many perspectives. Whether
the court can overcome the recent critical
perceptions and realities of its performance while trying to function efficiently
and fairly under a burdensome caseload
continues to be a topic of concern and debate.

III. Reforms Initiated by the
Attorney General
Since his 2006 announced reforms,
Attorney General Gonzales has left office,
and a new Director of the EOIR and a
new Chief Immigration Judge have been
appointed. Before leaving office, and not
long after the embarrassing news broke
about political appointments to the Immigration Court, 13 Gonzales reported to the

Senate that he put into place a new hiring process for IJs and Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) members that is more
"routine, consistent, and transparent"
and "developed extensive training programs for both new appointees and veteran immigration judges." 14 He also put

into motion some of the initiatives described in detail below. Despite all of this
external pressure and personnel turnover, or perhaps because of it, several positive steps have been taken, as reflected in
the EOIR's recently published five-year
strategic plan.15 The EOIR commits to

making improved efforts to achieve its
core values: 1) Equal Justice Under the

say is admissible if it is probative. See Rojas-Garcia v. Ashcroft, 339 F.3d 814, 823 (9th Cir. 2003); Morgano v.
Pilliod, 299 F.2d 217, 219 (7th Cir. 1962, cert. denied 370 U.S. 924 (1962) ("It is ...well settled that the rules of
evidence covering judicial proceedings are not applicable to administrative deportation proceedings.").
11. Respondents in removal proceedings have the right to representation, but not the right to appointed
counsel. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (b)(4)(A), INA § 240 (b)(4)(A) (2006).
12. Muneer I. Ahmad, InterpretingCommunities: Lawyering Across Language Difference, 54 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 999, 1027 (2007) (describing how "vast portions" of an asylum seeker's hearing "transpired in the client's
physical presence but mental absence" due to the lack of interpretation).
13. See Amy Goldstein & Dan Eggen, Immigration Judges Often Picked Based on GOP Ties, WASH. POST,
June 11, 2007, at Al; Richard B. Schmidt, Ex-Gonzales Aide Says She May Have "Crossed the Line," L.A.
TIMES, May 24 2007, at Al; David Johnston & Eric Lipton, Ex-Justice Aide Admits Politics Affected Hiring,
N.Y. TimEs, May 24, 2007, at Al.
14. Hearing on Oversight of the U.S. Dep't of JusticeBefore S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 21-22
(2007) (written statement of Alberto R. Gonzales, Att'y Gen. of the United States).

15.

U.S.

DEP'T OF JUSTICE,

ExEc.

OFFICE FOR IMMIGR. REV., FISCAL YEARS

2008-2013,

STRATEGIC PLAN

(Jan. 2008), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/statspub/EOIR%20Strategic%20Plan%202008-2013%2Final.pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 2008).
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Law; 2) Commitment to Excellence; 3)
Honesty and Integrity; and 4) Teamwork. 16 Acknowledging the need to improve technology, to expand its
workforce, to encourage and support pro
bono representation, and to ensure a fair
process, the EOIR has set four long-term
7
goals:1
1 Adjudicate all cases in a timely manner while ensuring due process and
fair treatment for all parties.
2 Deliver services to the public in a professional, courteous and timely manner.
3 Implement electronic filing to achieve
excellence in management, administration and customer service.
4 Provide for a workforce that is skilled,
diverse, committed to excellence and
exhibits the highest standards of integrity.
These goals reflect important values
that previously may have been unstated,
unstressed, or unpracticed, but now are
directly explicit. For example, Goal 2 requires better customer service that recognizes the diversity of people appearing in
court or needing assistance. Goal 4 relates to promoting and monitoring lapses
in appropriate judicial temperament, ethics training, and grievance procedures.
Some initiatives, such as enhanced
training and reforms in the selection pro-

cess have been announced, however since

they are not particularly visible to the
public, their implementation and impact
are still uncertain. Other changes that
have occurred appear to begin to move
the court in positive directions, although
not everyone would agree. Recently, the
President of the NAIJ observed, "[Tihe
reality in the trenches at the Immigration Courts is that most Immigration
Judges remain untouched by these lofty
promised changes."'s

A. Greater Oversight of
Conduct on the Bench
When a judge misbehaves in connection with official duties, most courts have
mechanisms for bringing a complaint.
Although many complaints are baseless,
the need for a disciplinary authority of
some kind is beyond question. For example, by statute, individuals can lodge
complaints against federal judges alleging prejudicial conduct or unfitness. 19
The Judicial Conference of the United
States recently updated its rules to establish a detailed procedure for lodging and
adjudicating complaints.20

In April 2001, the EOIR published an
ethics manual which sets forth governing
principles for all judicial officers and describes the complaint process for reporting allegations of professional misconduct

16. Id. at 4.
17. Id. at 7.
18. Dana Leigh Marks, An Urgent Priority: Why Congress Should Establish an Article I Immigration
Court, 13-1 BENDER'S IMMIGR. BULL. 3, 12 (2008).
19. Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, 28 U.S.C. § 351(a) (1980).
20. Press Release, Judicial Conference Committee on Judicial Conduct and Disability, National Rules
Adopted for Judicial Conduct and Disability Proceedings (Mar. 11, 2008) available at http://www.uscourts.gov/
PressReleases/2008/judicial-conf.cfm (last visited Mar. 26, 2008).
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to the Department of Justice's Office of
Professional Responsibility (OPR).2 1 Unlike the roster of disciplinary actions
taken against immigration practitioners, 22 the OPR does not publish findings
of misconduct concerning judges. In order to discover the frequency, nature and
disposition of any complaints, members
of the public have to file a Freedom of Information Act request.
Furthermore, because the complaint
process is centralized, there is no local
administrative oversight of judicial behavior of any kind. Long distance policing cannot be very effective, and certainly
does not signal to the public or the bench
that anyone with oversight responsibility
has any interest in the day-to-day conduct of the judges.
Spurred by the Attorney General
Gonzales' recommendations, the EOIR
has drafted a new Code of Judicial Conduct for Immigration Judges and published them for comment. 23 These
provisions appear to address directly the
criticisms about behavior and temperament voiced of many federal judges. Of
particular interest are Canons V, VIII, X
and XV which concentrate on competence, impartiality, professionalism and
civility, and ex parte communications.24

The EOIR also has institutionalized
an internal complaint process, along with
providing for some more direct oversight
of local courts. There is now an online
complaint form. 25 Appropriately, the
complaints are not made public, but to
date, nor are results of investigations
that may have discovered impropriety.
Surprisingly, individual Immigration
Courts have no on-site administrative
judges responsible for the daily functioning of the court. Even in larger jurisdictions where there are ten or more judges,
no single judge oversees the court. In the
absence of a hierarchy, judges are peers
who cannot keep an eye on or interfere
with each other's work. Moreover, local
lawyers have no direct vehicle to discuss
issues that might arise concerning courtroom behavior or management. Recently,
the EOIR created the position of Assistant Chief Immigration Judge (ACIJ) to
assist in the administration of the
courts.2 6 Each court is assigned to one of
seven ACIJs. However, some are geographically so far away from the court
they oversee that their effectiveness is
questionable, and the availability and
commitment of individual ACIJs to conscientious oversight is still unknown.

21. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ExEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGR. REV., ETHICS MANUAL, 4 (2001) available at http:l
www.usdoj.gov/eoir/statspub/handbook.pdf (last visited Feb. 18, 2008).
22. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGR. REV., List of Disciplined Practitioners, availableat
http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/profcond/chart.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2008).
23. Notice, 72 Fed. Reg. 35510 (June 28, 2007).
24. Id.
25. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ExEc. OFFICE FOR IMMIGR. REV., Filing a Complaint Regarding an Immigration Judge's Conduct, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/sibpages/IJConduct.htm (last visited Mar. 25,
2008).
26. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGR. REV., Office of the Chief Immigration Judge,
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/sibpages/ICadr.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2008).
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B.

Reassignment of Judges

The administration of the EOIR has
proven slow to take action in reported
cases of egregious misbehavior. While
one-time criticisms of individual IJ performance may not accurately reflect that
judge's performance record, repeated admonitions of particular Js in the Second
and Third Circuits reflect poorly on the
supervision and integrity of the Immigration Courts.27

Bad publicity is not only embarrassing, but also it creates an impression of a
much wider problem. Moreover, the recurrence of abuse and misconduct requires a systemic reaction. In the New
York and Philadelphia courts, the offending judges were temporarily removed
from the bench after multiple instances
of offensive behavior had come before the

Expressing frustration with below
standard decision making, at the conclusion of many opinions Circuit Court increasingly judges have recommended
reassignment of the matter on remand
because of the inability of the original
judge to competently, fairly, and rationally assess the facts and credibility of the
applicant. 29 This is a sorry commentary
about the loss of faith in the quality of the
judging at the original hearing. While
there are no known reports tracking this
recommendation, the Immigration Court
would be loathe to ignore the strong
views of the federal judges. But unless
the offending judges are reassigned off
the bench, or even removed, this solution
only transfers burdens to other judges.
C. Standardizing Immigration
Court Practice

Circuit Courts. 28 The problems presuma-

bly existed and were widely known long
before critical decisions were handed
down by federal appeals courts years after the original misbehavior. Keeping
judges in place for so long and failing to
take visible action in such egregious
cases undermines the credibility of the
court in the eyes of both the other judges
and the public.

Some basic Immigration Court procedures for removal hearings are set forth
in the Immigration and Nationality Act
3
and the Code of Federal Regulations. 0
However everyday practice in individual
Immigration Courts can be unpredictable
and inconsistent between both particular
courts and individual judges. Although
empowered to develop local operating

27. See, e.g., Aboubacar Ba v. Gonzales, 228 Fed. App'x. 7, 11 (2d Cir. 2007); Meizi Liu v. BIA 167 Fed.
App'x. 871, 873 (2d Cir. 2006); Mahamed Ayenul Islam v. Gonzales, 469 F.3d 53, 55 (2d Cir. 2006); Fiadjoe v.
Att'y Gen., 411 F.3d 135, 137 (3d Cir. 2005); Chain v. Att'y Gen. of the U.S., 445 F.3d 683, 686 (3d Cir. 2006);
Shah v. Gonzales 446 F.3d 429, 437 (3d Cir. 2006); Sukwanputra v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 627, 637, 638 (3d Cir.
2006).
28. See Bernstein 1 & 2, supra note 3; Gaiutra Bahadur, 'Bullying'Immigration Judge Absent, Replaced,
Phila. Inq., June 2, 2006, available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi-kmtpi/isJain16445432.
29. See, e.g., ABOUBACAR BA v. Gonzales, 228 F. App'x 7, 11 (2d Cir. 2007); Lin v. Ashcroft, 385 F. 3d 748,
757-58 (7th Cir. 2004), Niam v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 632, 660 (7th Cir. 2004), Lian v. Ashcroft, 379 F.3d 457, 462
(7th Cir. 2004); Korytnyuk v. Ashcroft, 396 F. 3d 272, 287 n.20 (3d Cir. 2005), Lopez-Umanzor v. Gonzales, 405
F.3d 1049, 1054-1060 (9th Cir. 2005).
30. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a, INA § 240; 8 C.F.R. § 1240, et seq. (2007); 8 U.S.C. § 1229 , INA § 239 (2006).
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procedures (LOPs) 3 1 there has been little
consistency between the various courts'
rules, and some have none. Some judges
have promulgated court rules governing
their own courtrooms, but down the hall
another judge may follow different rules
32
or none at all.
In February 2008, without any notice
or period for comment, the EOIR published a comprehensive The Immigration
Court Practice Manual.33 The Manual
provides detailed information on court
procedures including how to file documents with the court, master calendar
and merits hearing proceedings, motion
practice, bond and detention, and attorney discipline. These rules appear to capture in one document both existing
regulations and promulgate new rules.
To the extent that they provide guidance
to lawyers, judges, court staff, and other
representatives, they are a welcome resource in aid of both consistency and
transparency. Some particularly demanding aspects of the rules, however,
immediately generated responses from
advocates resulting in a postponement of
34
their effective date for further study.
While articulated formal practices
are an important step in the right direc-

tion that hopefully will help make the
court run more smoothly, their effect on
the front lines is an open question. The
new rules largely reiterate practices already on the books and do not account for
entrenched customary practices. Unless
bad habits are fixed, the contribution of
these formal rules on the fairness and efficiency of the court will be lost.
Calendars are long and individual
hearings can be delayed for months or
years. Government lawyers have very
few tools to remedy this overload. They
have little authority or incentive to exercise discretion in particular cases in an
effort to either reduce caseload or achieve
a just result.- For the most part, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
attorneys and immigration judges have
little time to prepare cases, instead relying on general information rather than
individualized attention. Nothing in the
Manual addresses how to manage the
court's caseload to encourage pre-hearing
preparation. In most litigation, parties
are expected to conference a case in advance, hopefully to resolve certain issues
or to narrow the evidence. In Immigration Court this rarely occurs despite some
judges' individual efforts to require ad-

31. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.40 (2008).
32. See Regina Germain, Putting the "Form" in Immigration Reform, 84 DENV. U. L. REV. 1145, 1146
(2007)
33. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ExEc. OFFICE FOR IMMIGR. REV., IMMIGRATION COURT PRACTICE MANUAL (2008),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/vII/OCIJPracManual/ocij-pagel.htm (last visited Feb. 29, 2008).
34. Press-= Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Exec. Office for Immigr. Rev., EOIR Extends Effective Date of
Practice Manual (Mar. 13, 2008) available at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/press/08/OCIJPracManExtDeadlineMar08.htm.
35. Despite the policy memorandum issued on November 17, 2000 by former INS Commissioner Doris
Meissner, encouraging the use of prosecutorial discretion, ICE attorneys seem to exercise discretion rarely.
Memorandum from Doris Meissner, Comm'r of INS to Regional Directors, et al. 1 (Nov. 17, 2000) available at
http://www.shusterman.com/pdf/ins-pdmemollOO.pdf (last visited Mar. 26, 2008).
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vance consultation. Even if evidence is
submitted 30-days in advance, as required, 36 at the Office of the District
Counsel where lawyers are assigned at
best only a few weeks before the hearing,
few lawyers are in a position to, or even
willing to, assess a case sufficiently in advance to have any effect on narrowing the
issues of the hearing. This creates inefficiencies and delays, and often results in
significant burdens placed upon the respondent.
Similarly, the Manual's Rule 1.7(e)
prohibiting ex parte communications applies to all partiesY It is striking that
this admonition had to be articulated at
all. The practice of ICE attorneys talking
to a judge about a case, whether about
substantive or administrative issues, is
rampant. Whether this rule will break
this habit remains to be seen. Lawyers
for the government are in court on a daily
basis and become familiar with the
judges and other judicial personnel. This
clubby environment always has risked
blurring role boundaries for the sake of
convenience or even expedience. Written

rules are a major improvement, but vigilance about changing unwritten customs
that may compromise the rules is critical
to effectuate any real transformation.
IV.

ReNorming The Court

As the stalled or failed proposals and
legislative initiatives have demonstrated,
the difficulties in changing immigration
adjudication are enormous. The recent
effort BIA streamlining reform of 200231
was intended to make the Board more efficient, to clear up its backlog, and to expedite final orders of removal. The
unintended consequence however, has
been to transfer the immigration litiga39
tion burden to the federal circuit courts,
while simultaneously eroding the stature
of both the immigration adjudication and
the BIA. Streamlining perversely may
have also caused inefficiencies by increasing the number of matters remanded
from the federal courts to the BIA. 40 Criticism of the streamlining regulations has
been so widespread that even the DOJ itself is questioning its wisdom,'4 1 and every

36. MANUAL, supra note 34, at 33 (Rule 3.1).
37. Id. at 13 (Rule 1.7).
38. Board of Immigration Appeals: Procedural Reforms to Improve Case Management, 67 Fed. Reg.
54878 (Aug. 26, 2002) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 3).
39. A five year comparison of federal appeals filed nationwide shows an increase in proceedings originating from the BIA from 4,449 in 2002 to 11,911 in 2006. That latter figure represents 17.8% of all appeals filed
and 90.9% of all appeals from administrative agencies. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS
OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 2006, tbl.B-3 (Mar. 31, 2007), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/
judbus2006/appendices/b3.pdf (last visited Mar. 26, 2008). For a detailed analysis of the skyrocketing rate of
appeal after April 2002, see John R.B. Palmer, Stephen W. Yale-Loehr & Elizabeth Cronin, Why Are So Many
People ChallengingBoard of Immigration Appeals Decisions in Federal Court: An Empirical Analysis of the
Recent Surge in Petitions for Review, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 4, 43-48 (2005)..
40. Remanded cases go through the system at least twice. In 2006, 1,798 cases were remanded to the
BIA. See YEAR BOOK, supra note 11, tbl.16 at T1-T2, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/statspub/
fy06syb.pdf.
41. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Exec. Office for Immigr. Rev., Fact Sheet, BIA Restructuringand
Streamlining Procedures (Mar. 9, 2006) available at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/press/06/BLAStreamliningFact-
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bill in Congress restored some or all of
the pre-streamlining features.
Mindful of the negative consequences
of the discredited streamlining reform effort, and wary about the difficulties attendant in enacting new laws, I have
sketched out a variety of non-legislative
options that would re-norm the Immigration Court. I have started with proposals
that would require few actual resources,
though they would demand a serious
commitment to revising business-asusual. I then proceed to suggest new
norms that would require an infusion of
additional resources or might entail
structural reorganization. Though more
costly and somewhat disruptive of the
status quo, these improvements would
likely produce benefits that far exceed
their costs.
A. Changes Calling for Personal
and Institutional Commitments
1. Standardize Rules of
Evidence
Immigration Court occupies a world
apart from mainstream litigation where
minimal procedural and evidentiary
rules are a way of life. Many of the
judges and lawyers practicing there have
known no other form of law practice.
While informal procedures benefit effi-

ciency and decrease the stress of administrative adjudication, the absence of clear
rules about procedures and evidence in
the Immigration Court actually decreases
its efficiency by allowing for sloppy, unprofessional lawyering leaving the judges
without tools to manage their courtrooms.
Not only are the Federal Rules of Evidence generally inapplicable in Immigration Court proceedings, other evidentiary
rules regarding the authentication of documents 4 2 the formalities of direct and
cross-examination, and admission of oral
or written evidence are honored inconsistently depending on the particular judge,
and even the particular case. Sometimes
the absence of evidentiary hurdles is
helpful to the respondent particularly in
asylum cases where the applicant may
have no way of producing official documents to substantiate the allegations of
persecution, or where hearsay testimony
is the only evidence about certain events
or states-of-mind. For example, respondents might be permitted to testify about
hearsay threats, offer an opinion about
the intentions of putative persecutors, or
introduce corroborating materials such
as affidavits or even letters without worrying about hearsay barriers. Written
submissions and testimony are usually
admitted into evidence and given appro-

Sheet03O9O6.pdf ("It is possible that eliminating BIA adjudication delays has increased the incentive to file
petitions for review in federal courts in order to postpone deportation and remain in the United States for as
long as possible."). On December 7, 2006, the EOIR issued a regulation at 8 C.F.R, § 1003.1 to increase its
members from its 2003 low of 11 to 15, still much lower than the 23 pre-streamlining members in 2001. 8
C.F.R. § 1003.1 (2007).
42. 8 C.F.R. § 1287.6 (2007). See Virgil O.Wiebe, Maybe You Should, Yes You Must, No You Can't:Shifting Standards and Practicesfor Assuring Document Reliability in Asylum Cases, in IMMIGRATION & NATIONALmTyLAW HANDBOOK

(AILA 2006-07, ed.).
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priate weight, a subjective determination
that may or may not be explained in the
judge's decision.
The lack of rules or even standards
for weighing the probative value of proffered evidence means that individual
judges are free to make evidentiary rulings according to their personal impression of the case and the witness.
Moreover, some judges routinely take an
aggressive role in questioning witnesses
without any evidentiary constraints, an
intimidating tactic when vulnerable asylum seekers are testifying. Sometimes
this usurpation is beneficial because the
judge is compensating for inadequate
counsel. More often, the interfering
judge is impatient to get to what he or
she perceives is the heart of the case regardless of the attorney's questioning
strategy or case theory. Objections from
counsel to aggressive questioning by a
judge are fraught with risk of alienating
the judge at the all-important hearing
which may be the applicant's only chance
of obtaining relief.
Clear regulations regarding the admission and use of evidence would standardize hearings nationwide and reduce
subjectivity and bias in adjudication.
Those rules could take into account some
of the benefits from the current system's
relative informality, and would increase
uniformity and thus fairness, and reduce
the impression of ad hoc rule making.
Moreover, lawyers will know what to expect and prepare accordingly without
having to guess which evidence might be

43. See Lustig, et al., supra note 10.

excluded or discounted.2. Encourage and
FacilitateProfessionalism and Pride
2. Encourage and Facilitate
Professionalism and Pride
Federal judges, the media, and their
own boss, the Attorney General have
found fault; it would not be not surprising, therefore, if immigration judges are
demoralized. The unremitting disparagement likely exacerbates the very
problems it exposes. The court, therefore, should seek ways to improve morale.
Raising expectations of professionalism,
and identifying and supporting ways for
judges to take pride in their work could
address this issue, while enhancing performance to the benefit of all parties and
the system.
a. Build in time for training and
reflection into the job
Immigration court practice is complex, technical, and demanding, but no
more so than many other legal practices
such as family or criminal law where
courts have equally disturbing cases,
large caseloads, and involve similarly difficult decisions with huge human impact.
To assert that the Immigration Court is
more stressful than other high-volume,
high-pressure courts overstates the
case. 43 It is true that given the large
number of asylum cases, judges work
with life-and-death facts that relate to violations of international human rights.
However this huge responsibility should
motivate rather than debilitate. An im-
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migration judge is part of a worldwide effort to assure humanitarian relief for
victims of persecution. The responsibility
can be extremely nerve-wracking, and requires concentration, dedication to a
search for the truth, as well as enormous
patience and compassion. Their job is to
do justice, a result that is possible despite
the burdens and pressures of this court.
Given these facts, IJs should be
proud of their work, not impatient or insensitive. Attorney General Gonzales
promised better training 4 which should
include more than legal updates, but also
intellectual stimulation, an opportunity
to exchange ideas, exposure to new approaches, and to feel part of a larger mission. Is require some care and feeding
in order to retain pride and motivation,
but such nourishment should come from
a sense that their work is important not
only to the individual before them but
also to humanity.

b. Author and Publish Written
Decisions
Immigration judges rarely write opinions. Thus, their discussions are not published nor made public unless the
lawyers do so. Some cases are decided
with a so-called "short order" in which
the IJ does not state the reasons for the
result. Most regular decisions are delivered orally from the bench leaving no
public record unless the case is appealed.
In light of the reports of disparities, IJs
should make their written decisions

available to the public. While not precedential, information sharing would create
a culture of respect for each other and educate others on the bench about country
conditions, credibility assessments,
methods of legal analysis, and modes of
expression. Judges can and should be a
resource to each other and should take
pride in well-reasoned decisions while being open to constructive criticism.
Even if they do not write decisions,
the judges could regularly engage in collective self-education by sharing information about cases and explaining to each
other the bases for decision making. 45 As
the authors of the recent article on disparities in asylum decisions suggest, it
might benefit the individual judges, and
help to overcome isolation, if they conferred with each other. But this conversation should extend beyond trying to
understand their differences to examine
legal and factual premises. The medical
model of "grand rounds" might work well
for immigration judges. Setting aside
enough time and creating an environment of greater collaboration could be
very beneficial to the intellectual life of
the judges.
c. Increase Self-Awareness and
Self-Monitoring
Where are the diligent, hard working
judges when a colleague is falling off the
deep end, or even behaving with less than
ideal judicial conduct? The court suffers
today from the embarrassment of public

44. Gonzales Memorandum, supra note 1.
45. Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew I. Schoenholtz, & Philip G. Schrag, Refugee Roulette: Disparities in
Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295, 382 (2007) [hereinafter Refugee Roulette].
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exposure of its weak links. Yet its steady,
reliable, conscientious judges are reluctant to intervene or share responsibility
for the behavior of their colleagues.
While changing interpersonal mores is always difficult, a culture of ignoring serious temperamental and emotional
problems does not advance the cause of
Other judges
respect for the court.
should be concerned about their own integrity and the reputation of the Immigration Court when a circuit court judge
describes "analysis . . . far below the
minimum required to support an administrative decision, "46 behavior as "argumentative, sarcastic, impolite, and overly
hostile,"4 7 or "the tone, the tenor, the disparagement, and the sarcasm of the IJ
[is] more appropriate to a court television
"4
show than a federal court proceeding. 1
Although it is difficult for outsiders to
know how much peer support may already be taking place, concern for the
court's reputation as an institution and
their own as its members should move
the IJs to action.

B. Changes Requiring
Resources and Formal
Implementation
1. Fixed Renewable Terms with
Articulated Standards and a
Transparent Process
A bench packed with career government lawyers is not truly neutral. Although purportedly a diverse group, 49 in
reality, immigration judges overwhelmingly have roots in the government, and
almost all have worked for Department of
Homeland Security (or the legacy Immigration and Naturalization Service), or
the DOJ in their earlier careers. Given
the job qualifications, 5° it is not surprising that most immigration judges come
from these ranks, particularly since this
job is an upward career step for a government employee in the immigration field,
and it is a job that promises considerable
respect, security, and a decent salary.
It is striking how many of the traditional criteria associated with judicial selection are missing from the DOJ list. 51

46. Guchshenkov v. Ashcroft, 366 F.3d 554, 560 (7th Cir. 2004).
47. Mahamed Ayenul Islam v. Gonzales, 469 F.3d 53, 55 (2d Cir. 2006).
48. Qun Wang v. Att'y Gen. of the U.S., 423 F.3d 260, 269 (3d Cir. 2005).
49. See CREPPY, ET AL. supra note 5, at 89.
50. The minimum qualifications require admission to the bar of any state or territory or the District of
Columbia with at least seven years of practice, along with substantial knowledge of the INA, its regulations,
substantial litigation experiences and knowledge of judicial practices and procedures, inter alia. The salary
range is $109,720 to 149,200 a year. See USAJOBS, the government's official source ofjob information posted
on May 30, 2003 for a vacancy on the New York Immigration Court, available at http:/!
jsearch.usajobs.opm.gov/ftva.asp?OPMControl+IN8567 (online posting expired). This salary is competitive
with the 2005 salaries of U.S. District Court judges at $162,100 and federal Bankruptcy and Magistrate
Judges at $149,142. CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, SALARIES OF FEDERAL OFFICIALS: A FACT SHEET, (2005),
available at http://www.senate.gov/reference/resources/pdf/98-53.pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 2008).
51. The ABA Standardson State JudicialSelection (2000) identify the principal criteria as 1) a minimum
of 10 years legal experience; 2) high moral character and a reputation in the community for honesty, industry
and diligence; 3) professional competence including intellectual capacity, professional and personal judgment,
writing and analytical ability, knowledge of the law and breadth of legal experience.; 4) judicial temperament
including courtesy, civility, open-mindedness and compassion; and 5) service to the law and a commitment to
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Notably absent are factors such as character, demeanor, experience with and
sensitivity about cross-cultural communications, experience or training in interacting with victims of abuse or torture, or
expertise in historical, political, or current events. Furthermore, unlike other
judicial appointment processes, there
seems to be little or no public input, either from lawyers (adversaries or colleagues), judges, or members of the
public. Nor is there any independent judicial screening process or input from the
profession like that which might occur at
a bar association or other civic group to
evaluate the fitness of candidates for judicial office.
a. Establish Fixed Terms with
Clear Retention Standards
Immigration judgeships are anomalous. Immigration judges are employees
of the EOIR with as much job security as
that dependent relationship and civil service protections allow. Yet, they also
have no fixed term of office. In essence,
they are life-time DOJ civil service jobs.
Thus, their dependency on the hand that
feeds them, the Attorney General, makes
them vulnerable to a boss who is the chief
law enforcement officer in the country.
But their status also immunizes them
against other forces such as immigrant
groups, the immigration bar, and the
public in general. They cannot be voted

off the bench, nor can a non-partisan review find them unqualified. Without a
term of appointment they are not subject
to any meaningful periodic performance
review in order to retain their jobs, providing little external incentive to worry
about the quality of their judging, their
demeanor, or the opinion of anyone
outside the EOIR hierarchy. To the extent that there is any performance review
by the EOIR administration, it tends to
focus on productivity, or possibly politics,
rather than quality of their work.
Fixed-term appointments are important checks on performance. It is not
hard to imagine that such a grueling routine can lead to fatigue and cynicism that
manifests in deteriorating demeanor,
sloppy reasoning, impatience, or insensitivity.5 2 Until the recent spate of federal
court decisions, intemperate judges could
conduct their daily business almost invisibly with virtual impunity. They had no
real expectation of being reversed by the
BIA, no sense that their legal and personal judgments had any consequences
other than to the parties, and no objective
standards against which their decision
making or deportment would be measured. Without a performance review
mechanism with public input prior to reappointment, there is no external incentive to achieve the highest judicial
standards. Apparently internal incentives are inadequate in some instances.

improving the availability of justice. ABA Standing Comm. on Judicial Independence Comm'n on State Judicial Selection Standards, Standards on State Judicial Selection 7 (2000).
52. Lustig, et al., supra note 10.
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b. Create and Apply Clear and
Public Performance Standards
Immigration judges are not Adminstrative Law Judges, thus, the Administrative Procedure Act prohibition against
performance review as a means to protect
their independence actually does not apply to them. 53 In a system of fixed-term

appointments, reappointment and performance, however, standards would
have to be promulgated. Since many
states, as well as the American Bar Association, have either adopted or proposed
adoption of performance evaluation standards that are sufficiently broad and well
established, some more job-specific standards for IJs surely can be articulated.
In most jurisdictions, standards for
retention focus on qualitative performance factors. 54

These may be framed

somewhat generally, but they set important aspirational goals. Most jurisdictions also have either adopted or
proposed adoption of performance evaluation standards that are sufficiently broad
and well established. Some job-specific
standards for IJs surely can be articulated as well.

Performance reviews, coupled with
peer conversations and support, would
assist to regularize factors considered in
the more subjective aspects of IJ decision
making involving credibility assessments
and the exercise of discretion, and perhaps avoid some of the extremes of inconsistency. Immigration judges routinely
make credibility assessments and draw
factual inferences, determinations that
are subject to a very deferential standard
of review both in the BIA 55 and in federal
court. 5 Yet, to read circuit court decisions excoriating many irrational decisions, IJs sometimes lack commonsense
and logical reasoning. This characterization is extremely troubling in light of the
high standard of review so that each remand on this basis should be analyzed
and made part of the education process.
Additionally, IJs routinely exercise
discretion, another highly subjective determination, without many clear standards or rules to guide them.57 Thus, the
values and norms of the individual immigration judge may determine an essentially unreviewable outcome. Or as
Maurice Roberts noted, "[T]he fact re-

53. ALJs are considered to be Afunctionally comparable@ to judges in the district courts and benefit from
similar tenure. In order to preserve their independence from the parent agency, federal ALJs historically have
been exempted from formal performance evaluation despite repeated efforts to subject them to review. The
APA allows removal of AI.Js for cause, but protects them from discharge or lesser penalties for political or
arbitrary reasons. Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, 5 U.S.C. § 7521 (2000); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.137 (2007).
54. For example, the ABA Standards on State Judicial Selection 2000 identify five retention criteria: 1)
preparation, attentiveness and control over judicial proceedings; 2) judicial management skills; 3) courtesy to
litigants, counsel and court personnel; 4) public disciplinary sanctions; and 5) quality of judicial opinions.
Standardson State Judicial Selection, supra note 51 (Part A, Standard A.2). See also, StandardsRelating to
Court Organization § 1.27 (1990).
55. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i) (2007).
56. 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (b)(4), INA § 242 (b)(4) (2006).
57. Daniel Kanstroom, Surrounding the Hole in the Doughnut: Discretion and Defense in U.S. Immigration Law, 71 TUL. L. REV. 703, 761-767 (1997); see also Maurice A. Roberts, The Exercise of Discretion Under
the Immigration Laws, 13 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 144, 158-163 (1975).
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mains that [discretionary decision making] is exercised by impressionable and
fallible human beings at all levels of the
administrative hierarchy."8 Comparing
the evidence and factors that go into an
exercise of discretion to break down its
constituent elements would be instructive and make IJs feel less isolated.
2. Guarantee Legal
Representation to All Indigent
Asylum Seekers and Children
Respondents in removal proceedings
have the right to representation and may
be represented by counsel, by accredited
representatives, by law students, and
even by "reputable individuals." 59 There
is no right to court-appointed counsel so
the court frequently must extend time,
sometimes over many months, to obtain a
lawyer.0 While many respondents somehow do obtain counsel, the system ultimately seems to force the majority of
respondents to contest their removal pro
se and certainly encourages people to find
any representative, often drawn from a
pool known for its substandard skills and
ethics.61 And representation matters: It
is well documented that representation
improves an individual's chance of suc-

cess.62 Yet, in 2006 only 35% of all persons appearing in Immigration Court
3
were represented.6
Unquestionably, representation, even
by the least skilled, is preferable to having individuals with limited or no English
language proficiency presenting evidence
and arguing their own cases. Although
the reputation of the immigration bar is
not high, testimony and evidence organized by a qualified representative usually
will provide a clearer basis for the judge's
decision. When confronted by an unrepresented individual, the IJ will probably
grant multiple continuances to obtain
counsel rather than force a pro se hearing, an inefficiency that would try the patience of any judge. A system for
subsidizing appointed counsel would
have the advantage of fewer delays as
well as better prepared cases. There are
any number of appointed counsel systems
in federal, state, and local criminal cases
which could serve as a model for a system
in Immigration Court, particularly in categories of cases in which the facts and
law are most complex, the respondents
the most vulnerable, and the stakes the
highest: asylum relief and the adjudication of children's status.

58. Roberts, supra note 57, at 147.
59. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a, INA § 240 (b)(4); 8 C.F.R. §§ 292.1, 292.2 (2007).
60. Lin v. Ashcroft, 356 F. 3d 1027, 1043-45 (9th Cir. 2004).
61. Many immigration practitioners are substandard, and some even corrupt or criminal. See Matt
Hayes, CorruptLawyers Aid Immigration Woes, FoxNews.com, Apr. 29, 2002, http://www.foxnews.com/story/
0,2933,72149,00.html; Alisa Solomon, Bad Counsel: The Arrest of an Immigration Lawyer Charged With
Smuggling Turns Up the Heat on the INS, VILLAGE VOICE, Oct. 10, 2000 available at http:!!
www.villagevoice.com/news/0041,fsolomon,18869,1.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2008).
62. Andrew I. Schoenholtz & Jonathon Jacobs, The State of Asylum Representation:Ideas for Change, 16
GEO. IMMIG. L.J. 739, 765 (2002) (reporting that represented individuals are four to six times more likely to be
granted relief).
63. YEAR BOOK, supra note 9, at G1.
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Scholars and practitioners have
urged a system of appointed counsel for
indigent asylum seekers, at least in nonfrivolous asylum cases.- The judges
themselves should be supporting this reform rather than relying on pro bono
counsel on the one hand and questionably
competent practitioners on the other. Indeed, the presence of a qualified lawyer
would so enhance the presentation of the
case-fewer delays, better prepared papers, better researched claims, clearer legal theories-that there would be far
fewer adjournments, the hearings would
be conducted more efficiently and
smoothly, and the outcomes would be
more reliable since the claim for relief
had been fully presented. An improved
immigration bar would make the job of
the IJ easier resulting in less stress and
frustration.
V.

sion, often involving people who are very
worthy, who have truly suffered and been
abandoned by their own countries, or who
have earned the right to stay in this
country though time, stakes, contributions, and character. Every time an IJ
grants asylum or other forms of relief to a
genuinely deserving person, the job
should feel like the best job imaginable.
This happened in 45% of all asylum cases
in 2006.65 So, almost half of the time, an
IJ should experience great job satisfaction. As for the rest of the time, if the
judges are fairly, impartially, and respectfully assessing facts, applying the
law correctly, drawing logical and rational inferences, and behaving prudently and judiciously, then the other
half of their work should also be satisfying, albeit extremely challenging and demanding.

Conclusion

Immigration judges have a job that
allows them to make a life-altering deci-

64. See, e.g., Refugee Roulette, supra note 45, at 384; Schoenholtz, supra note 62, at 753-54; Stephen H.
Legomsky, Learning to Live with Unequal Justice:Asylum and the Limits to Consistency, 60 STAN. L. REV. 413,
449-50 (2007).
65. YEAR BOOK, supra note 9, at K2-K3. The court completed 84,280 cases in which applications for relief
were filed. Id. at N1. Of those, asylum was granted in 13,343 cases. Other forms of relief, including withholding or removal, cancellation of removal, adjustment of status, amounting to 19,105 cases, were also granted in
2006. Id. at M1, R3.

